The verdict is out on the Neeraj Grover case and Emile Jerome stands convicted. A young man, a naval officer caught in a web of passion and death. It’s murky, something we normally thrive on and love to see on screen, but when it comes to reality, we sudden develop a conscience, and often in our endeavour to seek justice like blood-thirsty vigilantes, we don’t care for the very law we claim to uphold. Rather unrelenting in our moral consciousness, we believe in right and wrong, and slap on the paint, black or white, with no shades of grey.
Picture this, the victim, Neeraj Grover, ostensibly seeking sexual favours of a young wannabe starlet, and she relents, all in a bid to make it big. Enter the third player, a young, ardent and smitten fiancé, a young naval officer, Emile Jerome, in love and passionate, unrelenting in his ardour, willing to sacrifice all, blinded by want that transforms to need, blurring all lines, and then he apparently kills in a fit of extreme anger, but could it be termed murder? After all Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code which defines ‘Murder’ clearly states intention or mens rea and knowledge that the act will lead to the death of the victim, as pre-requisites to it.
It is murder therefore, if you intended by your act to kill, as Section 300 of the IPC states:
Section 300 Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
Picture this, the victim, Neeraj Grover, ostensibly seeking sexual favours of a young wannabe starlet, and she relents, all in a bid to make it big. Enter the third player, a young, ardent and smitten fiancé, a young naval officer, Emile Jerome, in love and passionate, unrelenting in his ardour, willing to sacrifice all, blinded by want that transforms to need, blurring all lines, and then he apparently kills in a fit of extreme anger, but could it be termed murder? After all Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code which defines ‘Murder’ clearly states intention or mens rea and knowledge that the act will lead to the death of the victim, as pre-requisites to it.
It is murder therefore, if you intended by your act to kill, as Section 300 of the IPC states:
Section 300 Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
2ndly – If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused,
or
or
3rdly – If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
4thly – If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of heath, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Exception I – When culpable homicide is not murder – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:-
First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills, Y, Z's child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word of A's deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z's nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B's hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting or the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4 – Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation – It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 5 – Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Illustration
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
This case cannot but take you back to the K.M. Nanavati case; there are after all a few parallels. Both Emile Jerome and Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati were naval officers, and there was a woman involved, and a third person, a triangle… the fiancé/husband, the women they loved and the men who infringed upon the sanctity of those spaces… the quintessential crime of passion. But that’s where it ends. After all Emile Jerome did not come armed, neither did he go to the house of Neeraj Grover, seeking him out. He came seeking what he thought to be his life, his space and finding it compromised, reacted in a manner that can only be attributed to youthful and perhaps naïve passion.
In Nanavati’s case the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court in appeal, viewed the all important aspect of ‘grave and sudden provocation’:
This case cannot but take you back to the K.M. Nanavati case; there are after all a few parallels. Both Emile Jerome and Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati were naval officers, and there was a woman involved, and a third person, a triangle… the fiancé/husband, the women they loved and the men who infringed upon the sanctity of those spaces… the quintessential crime of passion. But that’s where it ends. After all Emile Jerome did not come armed, neither did he go to the house of Neeraj Grover, seeking him out. He came seeking what he thought to be his life, his space and finding it compromised, reacted in a manner that can only be attributed to youthful and perhaps naïve passion.
In Nanavati’s case the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court in appeal, viewed the all important aspect of ‘grave and sudden provocation’:
“Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and sudden" provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision: it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self- control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.
The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of "grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But if his version is true-for the purpose of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true-it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-control, but on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1.30 P.M., when he left his house, and 4.20 P.M., when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one. Even if any conversation took place between the accused and the deceased in the manner described by the accused-though we do not believe that-it does not affect the question, for the accused entered the bed-room of the deceased to shoot him. The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore, hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.”
This however does not apply to the case in hand and in my humble opinion Emile Jerome falls most definitely within the purview of the Exceptions under Section 300, and has therefore been rightfully exonerated by the Hon’ble sessions court judge of the more grevious charge of murder punishable under Section 302.
But then he is convicted under Section 304 IPC, of culpable homicide, which very simply reads as:
Section 304 Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of "grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But if his version is true-for the purpose of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true-it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-control, but on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1.30 P.M., when he left his house, and 4.20 P.M., when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one. Even if any conversation took place between the accused and the deceased in the manner described by the accused-though we do not believe that-it does not affect the question, for the accused entered the bed-room of the deceased to shoot him. The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore, hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.”
This however does not apply to the case in hand and in my humble opinion Emile Jerome falls most definitely within the purview of the Exceptions under Section 300, and has therefore been rightfully exonerated by the Hon’ble sessions court judge of the more grevious charge of murder punishable under Section 302.
But then he is convicted under Section 304 IPC, of culpable homicide, which very simply reads as:
Section 304 Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death ,but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Section 304 while being clearly defined is also quite complex in its understanding to those who are not acquainted with the IPC. The Section despite being written in free flow is spliced into two distinct parts; the first called Part I, for which the intention must be to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. And then there’s Part II, where intention plays no part, but knowledge comes to the fore, In other words the act which causes death should have been accompanied by the knowledge that the act committed would lead to the death of the victim.
In my humble opinion, Emile Jerome fits neither of these profiles.
What is a crime of passion after all?
It is unplanned, without forethought or pre-meditation (this said with due respect to the police who slapped on a 302 IPC to be read with 120B (which lays down the punishment for criminal conspiracy), without the requisite intention or mens rea, without even the knowledge that the act of striking out, even if it is to plunge a kitchen knife through the body of another human being, would lead to death.
And then the charge included criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B… only based on the fact that he was a possessive young man, who wanted to protect what he thought was his to love and to hold, and to protect with his life if need be. So he came, motivated by love and by anger no doubt, hurt perhaps, but not with intent or desire to harm. And then he sees a naked man in his fiancés house… and yes hell breaks loose, and as much as I feel sorry for the Grovers, I do feel that Emile Jerome was nothing more than a victim of circumstance.
The IPC itself very clearly, in its ‘Comments’ on Section 120-B lays down the ingredients of a criminal conspiracy to be:
Section 304 while being clearly defined is also quite complex in its understanding to those who are not acquainted with the IPC. The Section despite being written in free flow is spliced into two distinct parts; the first called Part I, for which the intention must be to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. And then there’s Part II, where intention plays no part, but knowledge comes to the fore, In other words the act which causes death should have been accompanied by the knowledge that the act committed would lead to the death of the victim.
In my humble opinion, Emile Jerome fits neither of these profiles.
What is a crime of passion after all?
It is unplanned, without forethought or pre-meditation (this said with due respect to the police who slapped on a 302 IPC to be read with 120B (which lays down the punishment for criminal conspiracy), without the requisite intention or mens rea, without even the knowledge that the act of striking out, even if it is to plunge a kitchen knife through the body of another human being, would lead to death.
And then the charge included criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B… only based on the fact that he was a possessive young man, who wanted to protect what he thought was his to love and to hold, and to protect with his life if need be. So he came, motivated by love and by anger no doubt, hurt perhaps, but not with intent or desire to harm. And then he sees a naked man in his fiancés house… and yes hell breaks loose, and as much as I feel sorry for the Grovers, I do feel that Emile Jerome was nothing more than a victim of circumstance.
The IPC itself very clearly, in its ‘Comments’ on Section 120-B lays down the ingredients of a criminal conspiracy to be:
(a) an object to be accomplished,
(b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object,
(c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby they become definitely committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means,
(d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act
It rounds up the ‘Comment’ by quoting from the case of:
It rounds up the ‘Comment’ by quoting from the case of:
Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v CBI, 2003 SCC (Cri) 1121
“To bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of Section 120-B, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the parties for doing an unlawful act…”
The Court very rightly in determining this case therefore did not consider the criminal conspiracy theory… and I hail the Indian judiciary for their clarity of thought.
But Emile Jerome is just a young naval officer, undecorated, living in a nation at peace with the world, and where his services can be dispensed with. He’s no Commander, no stripes on his chest, no alphabets following his name, and therefore no gubernatorial pardon awaits him… neither does a life on foreign shores where he can bury the ghosts of his past and move on.
Here’s a kid who having committed a dastardly but unplanned act, panicked at the very least, and tried to get rid of what he had done. At best he can be charged with destruction of evidence, which the IPC states as:
Section 201 Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender – Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false,
“To bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of Section 120-B, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the parties for doing an unlawful act…”
The Court very rightly in determining this case therefore did not consider the criminal conspiracy theory… and I hail the Indian judiciary for their clarity of thought.
But Emile Jerome is just a young naval officer, undecorated, living in a nation at peace with the world, and where his services can be dispensed with. He’s no Commander, no stripes on his chest, no alphabets following his name, and therefore no gubernatorial pardon awaits him… neither does a life on foreign shores where he can bury the ghosts of his past and move on.
Here’s a kid who having committed a dastardly but unplanned act, panicked at the very least, and tried to get rid of what he had done. At best he can be charged with destruction of evidence, which the IPC states as:
Section 201 Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender – Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false,
If a capital offence – shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
If punishable with imprisonment for life – and if the offence is punishable with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
If punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment – And if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration
A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with the intention of screening B from punishment. A is liable to imprisonment of either description for seven years, and also to fine.
So yes, convict him if you must on this charge. At the most seven years with time served, and good behaviour… But with a dishonourable naval discharge and a shattered life hanging above him, I think living itself would seem worse than a sentence of death.
‘If this is not murder, then where’s my son?’ screams the headlines of the Mumbai Mirror dated Friday, July 1, 2011.
In Nanavati’s time, during the last ever jury trial that India witnessed, relatively free from the incriminating third eye of the media, those honorable citizens had held the Commander ‘not guilty’, even though his act was deliberate, motivated by what was viewed by the jury as the deceitful and dishonorable intentions of the victim, and which caused the sessions judge at the time, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ratilal Bhaichand Mehta to declare the verdict as perverse and refer it to the High Court.
I would like to say that I am sorry that Neeraj Grover died, and that his life was cut short. I empathise with his parents and do not expect them to understand the law or even be rational about the judgement, but every act that results in death does not equal murder, nor does it warrant taking the life of the person who perpetrated the act. We live in a world that’s thankfully governed by law, howsoever unpalatable it may seem when it tilts the balance against us. But that’s what sets us apart, that’s what makes us civil, that’s what prevents us from descending into anarchy. Vengeance, howsoever wrought, whether illegal or sanctioned by the state is a horrible thing indeed, deliberate, pre- meditated and with intent and knowledge, all the things we harp against.
If it were up to me Emile Jerome would get three to seven… with time served.
After all there was no intent… no knowledge. And he has paid the price for his foolhardiness in full measure.
So yes, convict him if you must on this charge. At the most seven years with time served, and good behaviour… But with a dishonourable naval discharge and a shattered life hanging above him, I think living itself would seem worse than a sentence of death.
‘If this is not murder, then where’s my son?’ screams the headlines of the Mumbai Mirror dated Friday, July 1, 2011.
In Nanavati’s time, during the last ever jury trial that India witnessed, relatively free from the incriminating third eye of the media, those honorable citizens had held the Commander ‘not guilty’, even though his act was deliberate, motivated by what was viewed by the jury as the deceitful and dishonorable intentions of the victim, and which caused the sessions judge at the time, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ratilal Bhaichand Mehta to declare the verdict as perverse and refer it to the High Court.
I would like to say that I am sorry that Neeraj Grover died, and that his life was cut short. I empathise with his parents and do not expect them to understand the law or even be rational about the judgement, but every act that results in death does not equal murder, nor does it warrant taking the life of the person who perpetrated the act. We live in a world that’s thankfully governed by law, howsoever unpalatable it may seem when it tilts the balance against us. But that’s what sets us apart, that’s what makes us civil, that’s what prevents us from descending into anarchy. Vengeance, howsoever wrought, whether illegal or sanctioned by the state is a horrible thing indeed, deliberate, pre- meditated and with intent and knowledge, all the things we harp against.
If it were up to me Emile Jerome would get three to seven… with time served.
After all there was no intent… no knowledge. And he has paid the price for his foolhardiness in full measure.
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